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HUMAN NATURE, COSMIC EVOLUTION 
AND MODERNITY IN HÖLDERLIN
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Ab s t r a c t :  The German Romantic Friedrich Hölderlin developed a unique perspective on the 
relationship between humankind and the rest of nature.  He believed that humanity has a posi-
tive role to play in cosmic evolution, and that modernity is the crucial stage in fulfilling this role.   
In this paper I will be arguing for a reinterpretation of his ideas regarding the position of human-
kind in cosmic evolution, and for an application of these ideas to the ‘environmental crisis’ of 
modernity.  This reinterpretation is significant because it entails an inversion of the conventional 
notion of causality in the ‘environmental crisis’; instead of humans ‘harming’ nature, in the re-
interpretation it is nature that causes human suffering.
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Environmental Crisis, Human Suffering, Anthropocentricism.
Friedrich Hölderlin, one of the German Romantics, developed a distinctive view-
point on the relationship between humankind and the rest of nature.  His ideas are of 
particular interest because he yearned for an end to human suffering, but was also firm-
ly convinced that humankind was inevitably destined to be separated from nature, and 
thereby destined to endure suffering.  Hölderlin envisioned a positive role for humanity 
in cosmic evolution, a role which has significant implications for both human nature and 
cultural evolution.  In this paper I will be outlining Hölderlin’s ideas, and arguing for an 
application of them to the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity.  Hölderlin’s conception 
of the human-nature relationship as part of an unfolding process of cosmological change 
seems to be of great relevance today, an age that is characterized by belief in the mean-
inglessness of human existence, and by concern about the way that we have altered the 
pre-human conditions of the Earth.  Hölderlin’s views provide a unique perspective on 
modernity that is worthy of serious consideration.
I start by outlining Hölderlin’s views on the role of humankind in universal evolu-
tion.  I then review the secondary literature on Hölderlin that relates to these ideas.  I 
proceed to argue that Hölderlin’s philosophy is applicable to, and gives a unique per-
spective on, the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity.  I argue that the existing secondary 
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humanity in Hölderlin’s philosophy of cosmic evolution is therefore required.  My cen-
tral claim is that for Hölderlin, modernity and the related notion of the contemporary 
‘environmental crisis’ is a necessary stage of cosmic evolution, and thus that it is far from 
a ‘crisis’.  It is rather a necessary stage of disharmony that will inevitably be followed by a 
re-conquered harmony.  I will argue that for Hölderlin this disharmony is characterized 
by the environmental changes that are resultant from the development of technology.  
1. HÖLDERLIN’S PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN NATURE, COSMIC EVOLU-
TION AND MODERNITY
The starting point of Hölderlin’s philosophy is that there must be a basic unknow-
able reality which precedes self-consciousness wherein subjects and objects are not in 
existence but are both part of a ‘blessed unity of being’.  He describes this unity as, 
“Where subject and object simply are, and not just partially, united…only there and 
nowhere else can there be talk of being.”1  He argues that the ‘blessed unity of being’ 
(which he also refers to as ‘nature’) is responsible for the coming into existence of hu-
manity through using its power to initiate a division of itself into subjects and objects.   
This division of being causes the emergence of judgement.  Hölderlin states that, “‘I am 
I’ is the most fitting example of this concept of judgement…[as] it sets itself in opposition 
to the not-I, not in opposition to itself.” 2
The division means that human beings are not capable of actions that are independ-
ent of nature; Hölderlin states that, “all the streams of human activity have their source 
in nature.”3  It is revealing to compare this claim with the words of Hölderlin’s character 
Hyperion, “What is man? – so I might begin; how does it happen that the world con-
tains such a thing, which ferments like a chaos or moulders like a rotten tree, and never 
grows to ripeness?  How can Nature tolerate this sour grape among her sweet clusters?”4  
For Hölderlin, man is the ‘violent’ being, whose coming into existence in opposition to 
the rest of nature was initiated by nature.
Hölderlin sees this opposition between man and the rest of nature as culminating in 
modernity – an era he that he claims is characterised by the absence of the gods.  In Brot 
und Wein Hölderlin writes, “Though the gods are living, Over our heads they live, up in 
a different world…Little they seem to care whether we live or do not.”5  A key question 
for Hölderlin is how we deal with this separation.  He envisions two possibilities – the 
‘Greek’ response which is to dissolve the self and die, and the ‘Hesperian’ response of a 
living death.
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Aesthetics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 191.
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Philosophy Review, vol. 36, no. 4, 2003, p. 423.
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Hölderlin came to view the ‘Greek’ response as hubristic, it being based on an an-
thropocentric desire to oppose the division initiated by nature.  He thus sees the ‘Hespe-
rian’ response of living and carrying out actions that are dependent on nature for their 
origination as the appropriate non-hubristic response to our separation.  Hölderlin’s 
position is that as nature created the separation, only nature can bring the separation to 
an end.  He sees this process of separation and reconnection as part of a broader cosmic 
picture wherein nature is an unfolding organism rather than a huge mechanism.  This 
organismic view enables him to envision teleological processes in nature which give rise 
to his claim that there will be, “eternal progress of nature towards perfection.”6  
2. INTERPRETATIONS OF HÖLDERLIN AND HIS CONCEPT OF FATE
In this section I set out my view of Hölderlin’s conception of fate – that all human 
actions are part of the evolution of nature towards perfection.  I do this by reviewing the 
existing scholarly literature on Hölderlin and showing that whilst these interpretations 
all recognise parts of Hölderlin’s conception of fate that they do not capture the whole of 
it.  I start with interpretations of human nature, move on to cosmic processes, and finally 
consider the role of modernity within these processes.
At the level of the human there is a general consensus in the literature that Höld-
erlin’s position is that humans are endowed by nature with qualities that shape human 
nature, and that this inevitably shapes human interactions with the rest of nature.  There 
are various names in the literature for the qualities which are endowed to humans.  Den-
nis J. Schmidt refers to the qualities present in humans as their ‘formative drive.’  He 
claims that, “Hölderlin suggests that human nature and practices are to be understood 
by reference to a formative drive which expresses itself as a constant need for ‘art’.”7   In a 
similar vein, Thomas Pfau argues for an ‘intellectual intuition.’  He states that, “Hölder-
lin recasts the convergence of “freedom and necessity” as the most primordial synthesis 
of intellect and intuition itself, a synthesis which takes place within the subject itself.  He 
thus approaches what Kant had repeatedly ruled out as an “intellectual intuition”.”8  
In agreement with Schmidt and Pfau, Franz Gabriel Nauen argues that for Höld-
erlin, “all men do in fact have the same basic character…all human activity can be 
derived from the same elemental drive in human nature.”9   The ‘formative drive’ / ‘intel-
lectual intuition’ / ‘elemental drive’ identified in the literature explains why man can be 
seen as the ‘violent’ being.  Human nature is to engage in ‘art’, to utilize the resources 
of nature so that culture can be generated and sustained.  This generation of human 
culture actually benefits nature as a whole, but it requires large-scale modification of 
parts of non-human nature.  The destiny of man is thus a disruptive one.  It is clear that 
is also an undesirable one.  Nauen states that for Hölderlin, “Even war and economic 
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enterprise serve to fulfil the destiny of man, which is to “multiply, propel, distinguish and 
mix together the life of Nature”.”10
So Hölderlin sees human nature, economic production and even war as parts of a 
broader cosmic evolutionary process; the universe as a whole is seen as evolving to per-
fection.  There will inevitably be aspects of this evolution that from a narrow perspec-
tive could be viewed as ‘less than perfect’.  These negative aspects of the evolutionary 
process – from war, to the presence of evil in its entirety – have to be seen as inescapable 
parts of the whole process.
The key point is that for Hölderlin the cosmic evolutionary process ends in perfec-
tion.  Thus, Ronald Peacock argues that, “the division produced by conflict is followed 
by a re-conquered harmony.”11   Similarly, Anselm Haverkamp argues that an interpre-
tation of the poems Andenken and Mnemosyne is the expression, ‘where danger threatens, 
salvation also grows.’12   Whilst, Martin Heidegger translates the opening lines of Patmos 
as, “But where danger is, grows the saving power also.”13   Hölderlin’s view is clearly that 
from a narrow and short-term perspective danger and conflict are often the norm, but 
that these things actually play a part in bringing about a greater harmony in the future.   
In the long-term they are all part of the evolution of the whole universe to perfection.
Cosmic evolution is thus one long process of disharmonies and inevitably following 
harmonies.  Peacock argues that Hölderlin’s vision is of a, “harmonised process of life 
which comprises within itself the rhythmic movement from chaos to form and back 
again, and an emotional experience of this which in the sphere of nature knows only 
the one rapture, but in the human sphere suffering and joy.”14   It is revealing that this 
interpretation sees ‘violent’ humans as suffering, whilst nature is purely rapturous.  This 
clearly sheds light on the question posed by Hölderlin’s character Hyperion: “How can 
Nature tolerate this sour grape among her sweet clusters?”15  The answer seems to be 
that human ‘violence’ enables nature to be rapturous.  As part of this rapture humans 
experience suffering.
Why should suffering be a uniquely human experience?  To explain this Peacock 
cites part of a letter from Hölderlin to his brother, “Why can they [humans] not live con-
tented like the beasts of the field? he asks: and replies that this would be as unnatural in 
man, as in animals the tricks, or arts, man trains them to perform.  Thus he establishes 
that the arts of man are natural to man.  Culture, then, derives from nature; and the 
impulse to it is the characteristic which distinguishes man from the rest of creation.”16
The human impulse to culture has culminated in the era of modernity.  Hölderlin 
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     12. Anselm Haverkamp, Leaves of Mourning: Hölderlin’s Late Work, New York, SUNY Press, 1996, p. 48.
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Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition – An Anthology, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p. 
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sees this period as one of great significance as he sees it as a historical epoch that is 
characterised by the absence of the gods.  To be consistent with his views on harmonised 
evolution to perfection there must be a reason for this absence.  Indeed, Peacock argues 
that Hölderlin thinks that, “a godless age is part of a divine mystery, it is as necessary as 
day, ordained by a higher power.”17   Furthermore, Heidegger claims that the gods are 
still present, despite their absence: “man who, even with his most exulted thought could 
hardly penetrate to their Being, even though, with the same grandeur as at all time, they 
were somehow there.”18
The absence of the gods in modernity is deeply related to the contemporary danger 
that exists in modernity.  It should be remembered that this danger cannot be a cause for 
concern for Hölderlin – as all dangers are inevitably followed by regained harmonies.   
Nevertheless, Heidegger attempts to identify the exact danger that Hölderlin believed is 
present in modernity.  Heidegger claims that, “the essence of technology, enframing, is 
the extreme danger.”19   It must follow that for Heidegger, “precisely the essence of tech-
nology must harbor in itself the growth of the saving power.”20   He sees this as occurring 
when the essential unfolding of technology gives rise to the possibility of opening up a 
“free relation” with technology which is inclusive of non-instrumental possibilities.21  
In an interpretation of the 1802 hymn Friedensfeier, Richard Unger draws out Höld-
erlin’s views on the absence of the gods in modernity.22   In Friedensfeier the entire span 
of Western civilization is characterised as a thunderstorm which is ruled by a “law of 
destiny” which ensures that a certain amount of “work” is achieved.  Unger argues 
that it is clear that this “work”, “is the product of the storm itself and that it designates 
the harmonious totality of earthly existence during the coming era.”23   The end of the 
“storm” of modernity enables the arrival of a mysterious “prince” who makes it possible 
that, “men can now for the first time hear the “work” that has been long in preparation 
“from morning until evening”.”24
Following the inevitable successful accomplishment of the “work” of Western civi-
lization, the great Spirit will disclose a Time-Image which will, “be a comprehensive 
depiction of the historical process and its triumphant result.”25   Unger argues that, “the 
Image shows that there is an alliance between the Spirit of history and the elemental 
divine presences of nature – for the natural elements with which man has always worked 
have played integral and essential parts in man’s history.”26   The triumphant result of the 
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actions of humankind in modernity is clearly an example of a re-conquered harmony 
that follows division.
In Unger’s interpretation of Friedensfeier we have a picture of modernity in which 
humans are carrying out “work” under a “law of destiny”.  The crucial factor is that 
humanity is ignorant that it is working under a “law of destiny” in modernity, until mo-
dernity has ended.  It is then that through the Time-Image the great Spirit reveals the 
successful outcome of modernity, and the nature and value of the accomplished “work”.   
This is a prime example of a short-term and narrow perspective entailing the perception 
of a lack of destiny and of needless suffering, whilst in the longer-term the same events 
are seen to be an inevitable part of a broader positive outcome – the evolution of the 
universe to perfection.
This difference of perspectives can explain an apparent contradiction in the litera-
ture between Unger’s interpretation of  Friedensfeier, and Schmidt’s analysis of Hölderlin’s 
1801 letter to Bohlendorff.  This letter was written only one year before Friedensfeier and 
Schmidt claims that in it Hölderlin’s position is, “that the peculiar flow of modernity is 
the lack of destiny.”27   The apparently contradictory views of Unger and Schmidt can 
be reconciled through recalling Peacock’s interpretation that, “a godless age is part of a 
divine mystery, it is as necessary as day, ordained by a higher power,”28 and comparing 
it to Unger’s claim that men are blind to the point of the “work” that they have been 
carrying out until the “storm” of Western civilization has passed.
The comparison reveals that the “law of destiny” applies to the activities of human-
ity as a collective in Western history, activities that are ordained by a higher power for a 
specific purpose.  In contrast, the “lack of destiny” applies to individual human beings.  This 
difference arises because individual humans are unaware that their actions are part of 
an inevitably unfolding cosmic plan, it is only the fruition of the plan than enables reali-
zation.  Instead, humans believe that they have free will and live in a meaningless age.   
Therefore, modernity can at one and the same time be characterized as both a period 
governed by a “law of destiny” and a period constituted by a “lack of destiny”.  The dif-
ference is purely one of perspective.
This conception of modernity as simultaneously being a period of a “lack of destiny” 
and a “law of destiny” raises the issue of anthropocentricism.  If human attitudes and 
actions towards nature are in the interests of nature, then it seems that there is no such 
thing as a truly anthropocentric attitude.  The appropriate attitude that humans should 
take to the objective side of nature, given Hölderlin’s philosophy, has been addressed 
by Alison Stone.  She argues that because, “according to Hölderlin’s thinking, we have 
become separated from nature by its power alone, so it is not within our power to undo 
separation.”29   Therefore, “the appropriately modest response is to endure separation – 
to wait, patiently, until nature may change its mode of being.”30   This means that a truly 
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non-anthropocentric environmental view of the rest of nature requires, “the acceptance of 
disenchantment, of separation, of meaninglessness.”31  
This view is concordant with the “lack of destiny” perspective.  However, when the 
“law of destiny” is taken into account, then the hidden meaning is revealed.  Further-
more, the whole notion of the attitudes of individual humans then becomes irrelevant.   
It seems that there cannot be such a thing as a truly anthropocentric attitude, because 
all attitudes originate from nature, and they all lead to actions which fulfil the “law of 
destiny”.  It may seem that our attitudes to nature are of importance, but this is because 
we believe in a “lack of destiny”, and are inevitably blind to the bigger picture of the 
“law of destiny”.  Whatever our attitudes as individuals, our relationship with the rest of 
nature as a collective would be ‘for the best’.
3. A REINTERPRETATION OF THE HUMAN IN COSMIC EVOLUTION
The interpretations of Hölderlin that I have reviewed all give an accurate repre-
sentation of Hölderlin’s views.  However, they are all partial views.  They all miss the 
‘big picture’ of what Hölderlin’s views imply about what it means to be a human in the 
context of cosmic evolution, and the consequent implications for the perspective from 
which we should view modernity and the ‘environmental crisis’.  In an attempt to fully 
grasp these implications I am going to defend the thesis that: Hölderlin’s philosophy leads to 
the conclusion that the ‘environmental crisis’ is a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of nature 
towards perfection.  This is an interesting thesis because, if accepted, it would supplant the 
conception of the meaninglessness of human existence with a conception of positive 
cosmic purpose.
The argument I will be making centers on three key aspects of Hölderlin’s philoso-
phy.  Firstly, that he believes that nature is purposefully evolving towards perfection.   
Secondly, that he believes that the achievement of this perfection requires human ac-
tions.  Thirdly, that he believes that human actions are determined by nature.  Accept-
ance of these three claims leads to the conclusion that human actions are determined 
by nature as a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of nature towards perfection.   
As the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity is purely resultant from human actions, a 
second conclusion inevitably follows.  This is that the ‘environmental crisis’ itself is de-
termined by nature as a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of nature towards 
perfection.
I will now present evidence to support the three key claims.  The first claim is that 
Hölderlin’s belief is that nature is purposefully evolving towards perfection.  The universe can 
either be viewed as a giant mechanism or as an unfolding organism; Hölderlin clearly 
held the latter view.  This conception of the universe explains his belief that nature un-
folds in a way that serves its own purposes; that disharmonies are followed by regained 
harmonies.  This is why Peacock claims that Hölderlin believed in, “the eternal progress 
     31. Alison Stone, Nature in Continental Philosophy – Week 4, Section V, Friedrich Hölderlin, [online], http://www.
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of nature towards perfection,” 32 and, “the emergence of perfection in the course of natu-
ral development.” 33  
This firm belief clashed with Hölderlin’s personal yearning for immediate perfection 
in life.  His immense desire to see a morally just world was completely at odds with his 
philosophical belief that the perfection he sought could only be achieved in the course 
of natural development.  The movement to perfection envisioned by Hölderlin is thus a 
fatalistic one, an inevitable evolutionary progression towards perfection.  Peacock cap-
tures this with his claim that for Hölderlin there is an, “acute sense of ‘Fate’, of inevitabil-
ity, expressed again and again in his work.  Fate is revealed in the process of history… it 
is inherent in the passage of form to chaos, and of disintegration to a new harmony.”34
This first claim is the most straightforward of the three.  The second claim is that 
Hölderlin believes that the achievement of perfection requires human actions.  The starting point 
in defending this claim is Hölderlin’s central belief that nature used its power to divide 
itself and thereby create humankind.  This division means that the split was part of the 
evolutionary process rather than a random occurrence.  We can ask ourselves why this 
may have been a necessary occurrence.  An initial answer seems to be Nauen’s claim 
that, “Even war and economic enterprise serve to fulfil the destiny of man, which is to 
“multiply, propel, distinguish and mix together the life of Nature”.”35
In The Perspective from which we Have to look at Antiquity Hölderlin asserts that, “an-
tiquity appears altogether opposed to our primordeal drive which is bent on forming 
the unformed, to perfect the primordial-natural so that man, who is born for art, will 
naturally take to what is raw, uneducated, childlike rather than to a formed material 
where there has already been pre-formed [what] he wishes to form.”36   In a letter to his 
brother he also asserts that, “the impulse to art and culture…is really a service that men 
render nature.”37
The source of Hölderlin’s primordeal drive to art is nature, because it is nature that 
created us and endowed us with our capabilities.  This is clear from Peacock’s interpre-
tation that, “Man cannot be master of nature; his arts, necessary though they may be in the 
scheme of things, cannot produce the substance which they mould and transform; they 
can only develop the creative force, which in itself is eternal and not their work.”38
Hölderlin’s primordeal drive to art in humans has inevitably led to the epoch of 
modernity.  Human actions in this epoch appear to be central to the achievement of 
perfection.  Hölderlin claims that modernity is an epoch that, “is as necessary as day, 
ordained by a higher power.”39   Furthermore, humans have been involved in “work” in 
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modernity that is clearly constitutive of the importance of the epoch.  This is clear from 
Unger’s interpretation of Friedensfeier in which the “law of destiny” ensures that a certain 
amount of human “work” is done.  The crucial factor is that humanity is ignorant that it 
is working under a “law of destiny” in modernity, until modernity has ended.  It is then 
that through the Time-Image the great Spirit reveals the successful outcome of moder-
nity, and the nature and value of the accomplished “work”.
There is no doubt that in Hölderlin’s view human actions and their resultant “work” 
in modernity are part of purposeful evolution to perfection.  What is interesting is the 
exact nature of the “work”.  There is an obvious connection between the “work” of mo-
dernity (Friedensfeier) and the “danger” we face in modernity (Patmos).  Heidegger’s inter-
pretation of Patmos that, “the essence of technology, enframing, is the extreme danger,”40 
makes it clear that the “work” of modernity is the development of technology.  In fact, 
technological development in modernity seems to be the culmination of Hölderlin’s 
primordeal drive to art.  Furthermore, it is very hard to think of any other distinctive 
aspects of modernity that are resultant from human actions, present an extreme danger, 
and have cosmic significance.  Therefore, for Hölderlin, the achievement of perfection 
seems to require the human development of technology.
It is interesting that Heidegger sees the danger we face from the “work” of moder-
nity as the essence of technology rather than actual technology.  Andrew Feenberg has 
criticised Heidegger for this abstract concentration on essences rather than the actual 
technology itself.41   A “Feenberg interpretation” of Patmos seems to be more in accord-
ance with Hölderlin’s views than the “Heidegger interpretation”, as Hölderlin’s philoso-
phy is grounded in actualities rather than essences.  Hölderlin sees a positive role for 
actual technology in cosmic evolution; this means that actual technology has a cosmic 
purpose.  Therefore, it seems that both the danger we face, and the saviour, must be the 
actual technology developed by human actions.
The importance of the human split from the rest of nature can also be seen in the 
words of Hölderlin’s character Hyperion: “How should I escape from the union that binds 
all things together?  We part only to be more intimately one, more divinely at peace 
with all, with each other.  We die that we may live.”42   Human actions are thus depicted 
as a ‘living death’ that is necessary for the life (and continued movement to perfection) 
of nature as a whole.  This explains Peacock’s interpretation that, “the sphere of nature 
knows only the one rapture, but in the human sphere [there is] suffering and joy.”43
The third claim is that Hölderlin believes that human actions are determined by nature.  There 
are many passages in Hölderlin’s novel Hyperion that attribute the responsibilities for hu-
man actions to a power or god:  “There is a god in us who guides destiny as if it were 
     40. Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 261.
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a river of water, and all things are his element.”44..…“oh forgive me, when I am com-
pelled! I do not choose; I do not reflect.  There is a power in me, and I know not if it is 
myself that drives me to this step.”45…..“I once saw a child put out its hand to catch the 
moonlight; but the light went calmly on its way.  So do we stand trying to hold back ever-
changing Fate.  Oh, that it were possible but to watch it as peacefully and meditatively as 
we do the circling stars.”46…..“Man can change nothing and the light of life comes and 
departs as it will.”47…..“We speak of our hearts, of our plans, as if they were ours; yet 
there is a power outside of us that tosses us here and there as it pleases until it lays us in 
the grave, and of which we know not where it comes nor where it is bound.”48
Hölderlin’s belief in the lack of human free will is perhaps clearest in his claim in a 
letter to his mother regarding the views of Spinoza that, “one must arrive at his ideas if 
one wants to explain everything.”49  Spinoza’s ideas can be summed up as, “Nature in 
all its aspects is governed by necessary laws, and human being no less than the rest of 
nature is determined in all its actions and passions, contrary to  those who conceive of it 
as ‘a dominion within a dominion’.”50
In order to make abundantly clear Spinoza’s - and thus Hölderlin’s – views on a lack 
of human free will here are two quotes from Spinoza:  “I say that thing is free which 
exists and acts solely from the necessity of its own nature…I do not place Freedom in 
free decision, but in free necessity.”51 And, “a stone receives from an external cause, 
which impels it, a certain quantity of motion, with which it will afterwards necessarily 
continue to move…Next, conceive, if you please, that the stone while it continues in 
motion thinks, and knows that it is striving as much as possible to continue in motion.   
Surely this stone, inasmuch as it is conscious only of its own effort, and is far from indif-
ferent, will believe that it is completely free, and that it continues in motion for no other 
reason than because it wants to.  And such is the human freedom which all men boast 
that they possess, and which consists solely in this, that men are conscious of their desire, 
and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined.”52
Furthermore, in an interpretation of Hölderlin’s Stutgard, Peacock argues that, “the 
laws of growth govern the culture as well as the lives of men…the one process compre-
hends all things and the one rhythm manifests itself again and again…in the progress 
of history; in the spiritual life of individuals.”53  In this vision not only human nature, 
but also the evolution of culture, is seen as an inevitable historical progression.  Pea-
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cock’s interpretation of Hölderlin is that, “man’s spirit is but part of the One Spirit,”54 
which  Hölderlin  insists  is  involved  in  a  “movement…through  successive  historical 
generations.”55  The spirit of man is thus governed by the larger Spirit of nature.  This is 
the sense in which, “all the streams of human activity have their source in nature.”56
The nature of the relationship between man’s spirit and the Spirit of nature is made 
clear in the following quote from Hölderlin’s character Diotima: “a unique destiny bore 
you away to solitude of spirit as waters are borne to mountain peaks.”57   This concept 
of individual humans having a unique destiny was the view of Johann Herder, who was 
one of Hölderlin’s inspirations.  Herder saw nature as a great current of sympathy run-
ning through all things which manifested itself in unique inner impulses within differ-
ent individuals.  This means that every human has a unique calling – an original path 
which they ought to tread.  As Herder states, “Each human being has his own measure, 
as it were an accord peculiar to him of all his feelings to each other.”58  Clearly, for both 
Herder and Hölderlin, human actions at any one time are determined in accordance 
with the movements of the One Spirit of nature.
I have presented evidence for the claims that for Hölderlin: nature is purposefully evolv-
ing towards perfection, the achievement of this perfection requires human actions, and human actions are 
determined by nature.  Acceptance of these three claims leads to the conclusion that human 
actions are determined by nature as a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of na-
ture towards perfection.  I now briefly argue that the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity 
is purely resultant from human actions.
The definition of an environmental problem is: “any change of state in the physical 
environment which is brought about by human interference with the physical envi-
ronment, and has effects which society deems unacceptable in the light of its shared 
norms.”59   This definition encapsulates a sliding scale of environmental problems from 
those that are local and temporary on the one hand, to those that are global and long-
lasting on the other.  The ‘environmental crisis’ as a concept has arisen because of the 
emergence in the last 100 years of an increasing number of environmental problems that 
are towards the global and long-lasting end of the scale.  The ‘environmental crisis’ is 
thus purely resultant from the human actions which have created environmental problems 
that are characterised by their global reach and long-lasting nature.
This means that the above conclusion, that human actions are determined by na-
ture as a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of nature towards perfection, needs 
amending.  As the ‘environmental crisis’ is purely resultant from human actions, it too 
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must be part of this purposeful evolution.  Therefore, the new conclusion that inevitably 
follows is: the ‘environmental crisis’ is determined by nature as a necessary stage in the purposeful 
evolution of nature towards perfection.
4. OBJECTIONS TO THE REINTERPRETATION
It could be objected that there are many references to human freedom in Hölderlin’s 
work that would seem to cast doubt on the third claim.  This is particularly noticeable in 
his novel Hyperion.  For example, Hyperion states that, “without freedom all is dead.”60  
However, this objection is easily answered because these references all appear in Höld-
erlin’s early work, and even then they are more than counterbalanced by the opposing 
fatalistic views that I have outlined.  In his early period Hölderlin was struggling to 
come to terms with the conflict between his keen moral aspirations for social change on 
the one hand, and his belief in perfection only arising through natural development on 
the other.  In his later work, as is clear in his endorsement of the ‘Hesperian’ response to 
our condition, he firmly accepts the powers of natural development and the determina-
tion of human actions by nature.  He realizes the futility of pursuing his idealistic moral 
aspirations because he accepts the illusory nature of human free will.
A further objection could be made that this reinterpretation is pointless because 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, which emerged shortly after Hölderlin’s time, gives a view 
of evolutionary processes that is incompatible with Hölderlin’s view that there was a 
‘blessed unity of being’ prior to the arrival of humans.  We now know that the emer-
gence of the human species – and its primordeal drive to art – was preceded by four 
billion years of evolution of life on Earth.  It can thus be argued that there was not a 
‘blessed unity of being’ prior to the evolution of humankind.
This is exemplified by the claim of Hans Jonas that the subject-object divide opened 
up four billion years ago, when, “living substance, by some original act of segregation, 
has taken itself out of the general integration of things in the physical context, set it-
self over against the world, and introduced the tension of “to be or not to be” into the 
neutral assuredness of existence.”61   This certainly does not appear to be a pre-human 
‘blessed unity of being’.  However, it is interesting that Jonas also sees humans as, “a 
‘coming to itself’ of original substance.”62
It is clear that this Darwinian based objection does not invalidate the views of Höld-
erlin, or the reinterpretation of them presented in this paper.  In fact, not only does 
evolutionary theory perfectly complement Hölderlin’s philosophy, his philosophy needs 
it.  The idea that nature could use its power to instantaneously create a being as complex 
as a human out of the ‘blessed unity of being’ is hardly defensible.  In the light of our 
knowledge today we can simply reinterpret Hölderlin as claiming that nature used its 
power four billion years ago to divide the ‘blessed unity of being’ and create a subject/
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object divide.  As he sees nature as an unfolding and evolving organism, the divide 
would give rise to human subjects after a sufficient period of time.  This, ““coming to 
itself” of original substance”, as Jonas describes it, has in actuality taken approximately 
four billion years.
5. CONCLUSION
I have argued that the existing secondary literature has not grasped the full implica-
tions of Hölderlin’s thought for what it means to be a human in modernity.  By drawing 
together Hölderlin’s ideas I have sought to understand his notion of the purpose of hu-
man actions, and what this purpose means for the contemporary ‘environmental crisis’.
Hölderlin’s conception of nature is an organism unfolding to perfection.  I have 
argued that he sees modernity as an important stage of this unfolding, which is char-
acterized by the development of technology through human actions.  I have further 
argued that this means that the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity – a side-effect of 
the development of technology – is also an inevitable stage of this unfolding; it is in the 
interests of nature.  As nature continues to unfold, the disharmony of modernity will be 
succeeded by a re-conquered harmony.  I have argued that Hölderlin’s ‘saving power’ is 
actual technology, as this seems most consistent with his thought.  Heidegger’s view, that 
the ‘saving power’ is the essencing of technology, seems inconsistent with the positive 
role of technology in cosmic evolution that is envisioned by Hölderlin.
The reinterpretation I have outlined clearly entails an inversion of the conventional 
notion of causality in the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity.  Humanity is convention-
ally pictured as harming nature.  My thesis has shown that for Hölderlin it is nature that 
is ‘harming’ humanity.  We have been cast aside out of the rapture of nature into a realm 
of suffering and self-consciousness, with the purpose of developing technology to serve 
the purposes of the unfolding nature of which we are a part.
We are left with the question of what our attitudes to nature should be, given this 
reinterpretation of what it means to be a human in cosmic evolution.  The answer is 
simple.  As nature is the source of our individual attitudes, our attitudes to nature must 
be in the interests of nature.  Our attitudes, whether they are techno-centric, environ-
mentalist, quietist, or nature-exploitative are all correct for us as individuals, because in 
the aggregate they fulfil the purpose of nature as a whole.  There is no such thing as an 
anthropocentric attitude.
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